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Abstract
In their article, “Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty”, (Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 46:3, 2018), Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve develop an
original moral decision theory for cases under uncertainty, called “pluralist
egalitarianism under uncertainty". In this paper, I firstly sketch their views
and arguments. I then elaborate on their moral decision theory by discussing
how it applies to choice scenarios in health ethics. Finally, I suggest a new
two-stage Ellsberg thought experiment challenging the core of principle of
their theory. In such an experiment pluralist egalitarianism seems to suggest
the wrong, morally and rationally speaking, course of action – no matter
whether I consider my thought experiment in a simultaneous or a sequential
setting.
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moral burden of ambiguity aversion
§1 Introduction
In Rowe and Voorhoeve (2018), Thomas Rowe and Alex Voorhoeve develop an
original moral decision theory for cases under uncertainty, called “pluralist egali-
tarianism under uncertainty".
In this paper, I firstly sketch their views and arguments. I then elaborate on their
moral decision theory by discussing how it applies to choice scenarios in health
ethics. Finally, I suggest a new two-stage Ellsberg thought experiment challenging
the core of principle of their theory. In such an experiment pluralist egalitarianism
seems to suggest the wrong, morally and rationally speaking, course of action
– no matter whether I consider my thought experiment in a simultaneous or a
sequential setting.
Let me first introduce Rowe and Voorhoeve’s theory. While one can find the origi-
nal defense of pluralist egalitarianism under risk elsewhere1, in this paper, the au-
thors focus on its uncertainty version, which they call it “pluralist egalitarianism
under uncertainty”. For sake of brevity and to differentiate the risk and uncer-
tainty version, let me label pluralist egalitarianism under risk per and pluralist
egalitarianism under uncertainty, peu. Briefly, peu holds that
[One] should improve people’s prospects for well-being, raise total
well-being, and reduce inequality in both people’s prospects and in
their final well-being (how well their lives end up going) (Rowe &
Voorhoeve, 2018, 243-244).
1See Fleurbaey (2018), Fleurbaey (2010), Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve (2018) and
Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2018).
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This paper, which focuses on this latter version, is organized as follows. In Section
2, we provide some background on the pluralist egalitarianism under uncertainty.
In Section 3, we elaborate on this theory by discussing its concrete moral recom-
mendations in the context of health ethics. In Section 4, we propose a thought
experiment within their context of health ethics, challenging both the moral per-
missibility and rational permissibility of peu.
§2 The Permissibility of Pluralist Egalitarianism
In this section, I resume the moral permissibility and the rational permissibility of
peu. In both cases, the authors justify the permissibility by showing that the core
principle of peu that I label the uncertainty moral aversion principle2
complies with specific moral principles and rational principles. Let me first start
by presenting these targeted principles.
The targeted rational principle is derived from the orthodox rational principles for
decision-making under uncertainty. These latter principles are themselves derived
from orthodox rational principles for decision-making under risk. One important
principle under risk, relevant to present peu, is the following: under risk, the
decision-maker is assumed to be capable of making up their mind to form (or has
access to) precise subjective probabilities regarding the possible states of nature
(Savage (1972)).
By contrast, under uncertainty, the decision-maker loses this precision ability. De-
2I use this label to avoid the confusion with the standard rational principle of “uncertainty
aversion principle” that we present here after.
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pending on the degree of severity of uncertainty, an agent will be capable to come
up with more or less imprecise probabilities. At the lowest degree of severity, the
decision-maker is assumed to be able to come up with a reasonable range of prob-
abilities (cases of “moderate uncertainty” in the authors’ formulation). At the up-
per level, it becomes more difficult to form probabilities. In such a case, the agent
ends up with extreme range of probabilities (cases of “severe uncertainty”). At
the highest level of severity, it becomes simply implausible to imagine an agent
capable of reasoning with probabilities: the agent deals with no probability at
all (cases of “maximal uncertainty"3). For each of these degrees of severity, deci-
sion theorists from economics and philosophy have developed specific classes of
decision-making models, each one differentiated by a variation of a generic stan-
dard rational principle under uncertainty: the uncertainty aversion principle.
This is the principle that Rowe and Voorhoeve use to build the uncertainty
moral aversion principle. Given the fact that the authors ambition to de-
velop a “moral decision theory under uncertainty”, namely a decision theorywhich
provides not only rational but also moral recommendations under uncertainty,
such a the standard uncertainty aversion principle has to be adjusted such that
it complies with the standard moral principles. Hence, the resulting morally ad-
justed uncertainty aversion principle is the the uncertainty moral aver-
sion principle.
3Also known as “ignorance” in the philosophical literature, see Bradley (2017). It is worth
noticing that the usage of these expressions varies depending on the niche literature that one
reader ends up reading, either or economics and also within different philosophy niches, which
might confuse the general audience. Hence, “severe uncertainty” could refer to “ambiguity”, as
“moderate uncertainty” can as well. But these misuses go beyond this specific ambiguity debate.
For this reason, in this précis, we strictly follow the authors’ terminology to avoid more confusion
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Before introducing this principle, let us present the standard moral principles that
peu principle has to comply with. The moral principle the authors look for is an
egalitarian principle, different from the standard ones in circulation in the moral
philosophy literature. Standard definitions of equality rely on the outcome’s val-
ues: two situations are equal if and only if individuals end up equally well off. One
could extend this claim under uncertainty such that the only morally relevant in-
formation to define "equality" is still the outcome’s values. However, according
to the authors, this definition of equality, pertaining exclusively to the value of
final well-being, would rule out crucial moral information to design a fair system
of distributive justice. Accordingly, one should incorporate the experience of un-
certainty itself in the definition of equality under uncertainty. This integration
operates as a moral benefit or a cost in the system of distributive justice. In Partic-
ular, for Rowe and Voorhoeve, facing uncertainty is a "burden" (op. cit. p. 242) in
the sense of depressing the value of an individual’s prospects. Therefore, it should
correspond to a moral cost. Let us see why in the following situation. Suppose
Ann will go wholly blind unless she receives a treatment. As her doctor, you have
two alternative treatments. The first treatment is well-known to all and risky. It
has a 50% chance of curing her and 50% chance of not affecting her. Since you have
implemented it in the past, and so, have access to a small distribution of success
and failure, you have certain prior beliefs in these current objective estimations
of success and failure. The second treatment is entirely new and maximally un-
certain. It leads to a full cure or no cure at all, with no objective estimation of
failure and success accessible. Since it is very new, you are not familiar enough to
counter the absence of objective estimates by forming precise prior beliefs about
5
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its effectiveness. Despite leading to the same two possible levels of final well-being
as the risky treatment, we can say that, in prospect, the uncertain treatment bears
a moral cost.
Based on these rational andmoral considerations, the core principle of peu is the
uncertainty moral aversion principle complies with both moral princi-
ples and rational principles. This latter holds that when choosing between a risky
prospect and an uncertain prospect, one should opts for the risky prospect4. With
respect to the descriptive rational permissibility, we can attest that the uncertain
aversion principle is descriptively accurate since the empirical results show that
this principle describes adequately how subjects behave uncertainty. However,
the philosophical and economic theory literature still contests the normative ra-
tional permissibility of this uncertainty aversion attitude. Namely, the debate has
not yet reached a consensus on whether a rational agent may permissibly display
an uncertainty averse attitude. Rowe and Voorhoeve do not engage in this con-
troversy. They instead adopt an assumption defended by some leading decision
theorists according to which it is rationally permissible to display an uncertainty
averse attitude, despite not being rationally required. This debate has focused in
length on the normative rational permissibility of this attitude.
However, much less has been said about itsmoral permissibility. Rowe andVoorho-
eve’s paper is important because it fills this gap. And, it is original in developing
a specific egalitarian interpretation of the uncertainty aversion. Finally, if we take
again Ann’s example introduced above, one would say that granting uncertainty
aversion, it would be morally impermissible to choose to incur on Ann’s behalf,
4As initially shown in Ellsberg’s original thought experiment, see Ellsberg (1961)
6
moral burden of ambiguity aversion
for anyone concerned by her welfare, which seems a sensible concern for any
distributive justice theory. In sum, pluralistic, uncertainty-averse egalitarianism
favors alternatives for which more fine-grained probabilistic information related
to the states of nature is available. Besides, this view considers uncertainty as
important moral information to rely on to take a fair distributive justice based de-
cision and should count as a moral cost (in the sense of depressing the value of
individuals’ prospects) in the system of distributive justice.
§3 Applying Pluralist Egalitarianism to Health Ethics
Let us now see how peu works in a more concrete situation. Suppose Ann and
Bea will go wholly blind and with lifetime well-being of 50 (moderately good qual-
ity of life) unless they receive treatment. If fully cured, each individual would
have lifetime well-being of 80 (very good quality of life). Both are strangers to
the decision-maker and each other. Unfortunately, the resources at the decision-
maker’s disposal do not suffice to cure both Ann and Bea fully. As listed below,
three classes of treatments are available to the decision-maker: certain, risky, and
uncertain treatments. The classes of certain and risky treatments each contain
two different treatments. The class of uncertain treatments includes four different
treatments. Among these eight treatments, the decision-maker has to choose one.
Hence, a distributive theory of justice can help to make up the decision-maker’s
mind.
Options
7
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(1) ineqality under certainty. Cure Ann and leave Bea to go wholly blind.
(2) eqal risk, uneqal final well-being. This treatment either cures Ann
and is entirely ineffective for Bea (leaving her to go wholly blind) or, instead,
is entirely ineffective for Ann (leaving her to go wholly blind) and cures Bea.
These results are equally likely.
(3) eqality under risk. This treatment either cures both individuals or is
wholly ineffective for both, with each result being equally likely.
(4) eqalityunder certainty. This treatment improves both Ann’s and Bea’s
condition to that of a merely partial, but still substantial, visual impairment.
We will consider both cases in which the level of well-being associated with
this partial impairment is precisely halfway between the well-being associ-
ated with complete blindness and a full cure and cases in which this level
falls short of this halfway point. The shortfall is given by a cost c, with 0 <
c < 15.
(5) eqal uncertainty, uneqal final well-being. This treatment will ei-
ther cure Ann and leave Bea wholly blind or cure Bea and leave Ann wholly
blind, with no information available about the probability of either outcome.
(6) eqality under uncertainty. This treatment either cures both individ-
uals or leaves them both to go wholly blind, with no information available
about the probability of either outcome.
(7) uneqaluncertainty. Ann is given a novel treatment that either cures her
or instead leaves herwholly blind, with no information about the probability
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of either outcome. Bea is given a distinct treatment which will either, with
probability 0.5, cure her or, with probability 0.5, leave her wholly blind.
(8) eqal moderate uncertainty. Ann and Bea are each given different dis-
tinct, moderately uncertain treatments, each of which will either offer a full
cure or leave its recipient wholly blind. For each of their treatments, the
probability of a cure ranges from 0.25 to 0.75.
Pairwise Comparison of Options Then, the authors consider the following
pairwise comparison of alternatives. They deduce the preference relations be-
tween the alternatives from their pluralist egalitarianism. We sum up briefly these
resulting preference relations.
A. (1) ineqality under certainty versus (2) eqal risk, uneqal Final
well-being. (2) is morally preferred to (1) because it gives an equal shot of
being cured for Ann and Bea whereas (1) cures one of the two arbitrarily.
B. (3) eqality under risk versus (1) ineqality under certainty. (3) is
morally preferred to (1) because not only does it give an equal shot of being
cured for Ann and Bea but it also eliminates all interpersonal unfairness but
still maximizes total expected utility.
C. (3) eqality under risk versus (2) eqal risk, uneqal final well-
being. (3) is morally preferred to (2) for the same reasons in B.
D. (4) eqality under certainty versus (4) ineqality under certainty.
Suppose there is no cost to remove the inequality, say, for 푐 = 0. In this case,
(4) is morally preferred to (1) because inequality is suppressed without loss
9
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in expected total well-being.
E. (4)eqalityunder certainty versus (2)eqalrisk, uneqalfinalwell-
being. Suppose 푐 = 0. (4) is morally preferred to (2) for the same reasons as
in D.
F. (4) eqality under certainty versus (3) eqality under risk. Suppose
푐 = 0. (4) is morally indifferent to (3) because both offers Ann and Bea equal
expected well-being and both are equally good prospects for each person
and neither contains any inequality.
G. (4) eqality under certainty versus (1) ineqality under certainty.
For some, sufficiently small 푐 > 0, (4) is morally preferred to (3) because it
eliminates inequality.
H. (4) eqality under certainty (푐 >0 but 푐 very small) versus (3) eqality
under risk. For all 푐 > 0 (3) is morally preferred to (4) because neither
contains any inequality but (3) contains more valuable prospects for each
person.
I. (5)eqaluncertainty, Uneqalfinalwell-being versus (2)eqalrisk,
uneqal final well-being. (2) is morally preferred to (5) because this
latter, due to the presence of uncertainty, reduces the value of individuals’
prospects.
J. (6) eqality under uncertainty versus (3) eqality under risk. (3)
is morally preferred to (6) because (6) reduces the value of each individ-
ual’s prospects and population level value prospect. (6) generates popula-
tion’s level uncertainty, because the decision-maker is uncertain about the
10
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anonymized distribution of final well-being5.
K. (7) uneqal uncertainty versus (8) eqal moderate uncertainty. (8)
is morally preferred to (7) because it distributes equally ex ante an equal
quantity of uncertainty over Ann and Bea and thus its moral cost is shared
equally among them.
L. (5) eqal uncertainty, uneqal final well-being versus (1) eqality
under certainty. For any decision-maker willing to incur a cost (푐 > 0) to
eliminate the uncertainty and/or the inequality, (1) is morally preferred to
(5).
Optimal peu Strategy Despite leading to the same outcome in terms of well-
being (either cured or not), the risky and uncertain treatments do not bear the
same moral values. The uncertain treatment is morally more costly than the risky
treatment because it would expose Ann and Bea to experiencing unnecessary un-
certainty, which is morally impermissible. Overall, uncertainty aversion and in-
equality aversion incur a cost to remove inequality. Hence, if the decision-maker
is inequality averse, but uncertainty neutral then for her, (2) and (3) are equivalent.
§4 Objections: A Two-Stage Ellsberg Thought Experiment
In this section, I propose two new thoughts experiments that I label “two-stage
Ellsberg thought experiments” and consider them in the case of health ethics. But
5Hence, (5) does not generate population’s level uncertainty but comes at the expense of certain
inequality in the final value of well-being between Ann and Bea.
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before presenting them, I rather show why such theoretical considerations will be
relevant for applied health ethics.
Consider the following scenario. You are the medical decision-maker for Ann and
you have to administer a treatment to her. This treatment is formed by the pre-
scription of two medicines at your disposal: medicine a and medicine b. For
the treatment to work, you have to prescribe two medicines to Ann but you are
not obligated to prescribe only two different medicines. You may decide to pre-
scribe both times the same medicine - suppose you have enough supply. Before
giving more information regarding the efficacy of each medicine, I shall precise
that I consider hereafter two versions of this decision problem.
I firstly consider the case where you have to decide simultaneously both medicines
that Ann will take. That is to say, once she has taken the first medicine, although
you observe her resulting intermediary health condition, you cannot intervene to
revise your decision made regarding the second medicine that she is about taking
- no matter what. Accordingly, at starting time t, you have four options:
(I) medicine a and then medicine b
(II) medicine a and then medicine a
(III) medicine b and then medicine b
(IV) medicine b and then medicine a
At time t+1 you have no more choice to make. At time t+2, you observe her re-
sulting final health condition and know whether she is fully cured or not.
Then, I consider a dynamic case. You have now to decide sequentially bothmedicines.
12
moral burden of ambiguity aversion
That is to say, once you have decided her first medicine and she has taken it, you
observe her resulting intermediary health condition and you intervene to decide
her second medicine. Hence, at starting time t, you have two options:
(I) medicine a
(II) medicine b
Then, at time t+1 you have a new choice to make from these two two options:
(I) medicine a
(II) medicine b
In time t+2, you observe her final health condition and know whether she is fully
cured or not.
We now turn to the description of the information regarding the efficacy of each
medicine. On the one hand, suppose thatmedicine a is well-known to all doctors
and health experts. Accordingly medical decision-makers know that medicine
a has a 50% of success and 50% of failure with respect to Ann’s kind of illness.
We say that it has a risky prospect of success and failure (i.e., a precise probability
distribution can be assigned to it). On the other hand, suppose that medicine b
has never been used before for Ann’s kind of illness. Accordingly, no expert has
information regarding its chances of success and failure. We say that medicine
b has an ambiguous prospect of success and failure (i.e., no precise probability
distribution can be assigned to it).
The choice problem in both cases simultaneous and sequential is the following:
which options should the medical decision-maker choose given the fact that they
13
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want to maximize Ann’s well-being (i.e., to fully cure her at her maximal well-
being)?
For the sake of of communicating in a simple manner my objections, I will repre-
sent in a simplified representationwhat ismeant by “medicine b (resp. medicine
a) is successful or not” by the drawing of a ball in a urn, as it usually done in philo-
sophical choice theory and economic decision theory. And we say that the treat-
ment is successful if you draw two balls of the same color in urns which contain
only two colors, Black and White. I build this representation on the framework
proposed by Fleurbaey (2019)6.
On the one hand, what my thought experiments have in commonwith Fleurbaey’s
one are the following elements: there are two urns, containing blacks and white
balls; one risky urn where there 50 black balls and 50 white balls and one ambigu-
ous were there are in total 100 balls but we do not its composition (whether all
Black, or all White, or some of each color, to what extent); two drawings, with re-
placement and winning the game if match in color. The main difference between
his and mine lies in the options considered and the alternatives we consider. He
considers the following three options : “drawing from the risky urn and again from
the same risky urn”, “risky and ambiguous” and “ambiguous and risky”.
On the other hand, the crucial difference is the following. Fleurbaey considers
the following three two-stage drawing options “risky and risky”, “risky and am-
biguous” and “ambiguous and risky” where he compares these options in pairwise
comparison. I propose two main differences. First, I introduce the following draw-
6I am grateful toMarc Fleurbaey to have let me access his unpublished manuscript. The original
framework within which his has been built can be found in Al-Najjar and Weinstein (2009).
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ing option: “ambiguous and ambiguous” and second, to focus exclusively to the
following comparison: compare it to the main opposite option which is “risky and
risky”. It is a fundamental since it is not intuitively straightforward to understand
that “ambiguous and ambiguous” is actually a better option, no matter what, than
the option “risky and risky” in terms of prospects of success7.
In the following, I briefly present all the options and the pay-offs. I will turn then
to our main comparison showing how it is decisive against peu). We also show
how FLeurbaey’s experiment can be a challenge to medicine a) depending on
whether we consider the agent to be naive or sophisticated.
Options
(I) risky and risky You pick a ball from a risky urn, 푈1 and observe its color.
It is either Red with 50% of chance or Black with 50% chance. You look at
the color and you put it back into the urn. Then, you pick again a ball from
the same risky urn, 푈1 and observe its color. It is either Red with 50% of
chance or Black with 50% chance.
(II) ambiguous and ambiguous You pick a ball from an ambiguous urn, 푈2
and observe its color. It is either Red or Black with unknown chance. You
look at the color and you put it back into the urn. Then, you pick again a
ball from the same ambiguous urn, 푈2 and observe its color.
7The former has its success prospects minimally bounded at 12 whereas the later has its success
prospect maximally bounded at at 12 : the best case scenario of risky and risky corresponds to
the worst case scenario of ambiguous and ambiguous.
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(III) ambiguous and risky You pick a ball from an ambiguous urn, 푈2 and
observe its color. It is either Red or Black with unknown chance. You look
at the color and you put it back into the urn. Then, you pick a ball from the
risky urn, 푈1 and observe its color. It is either Red with 50% of chance or
Black with 50% chance.
(IV) risky and ambiguous You pick a ball from a risky urn, 푈1 and observe
its color. It is either Red with 50% of chance or Black with 50% chance. You
look at the color and you put it back into the urn. You pick a ball from the
ambiguous urn, 푈2 and observe its color. It is either Red or Black with
unknown chance.
Pay-offs
(A) If you choose (I) and if you are successful, then Ann is cured and she ends
up with a lifetime well-being of 50. She is not cured otherwise and lives a
miserable life.
(B) If you choose (II) and if you are successful, then Ann is cured and she ends
up with a lifetime well-being of 80. She is not cured otherwise and lives a
miserable life.
(C) If you choose (III) and if you are successful, then Ann is cured and she ends
up with a lifetime well-being of 60. She is not cured otherwise and lives a
miserable life.
(D) If you choose (IV) and if you are successful, then Ann is cured and she ends
up with a lifetime well-being of 80. She is not cured otherwise and lives a
16
moral burden of ambiguity aversion
miserable life.
Optimal strategies In both cases, whether your two drawings aremade sequen-
tial or simultaneously, the optimal strategies is (IV) ambiguous and ambiguous
and, contrary to the common intuition, (I) risky and risky is actually the worst
option. Indeed, urn Risky wins with probability .5. If urn Ambiguous has propor-
tion 푝 of red balls, then it wins with probability 푝2 + (1 − 푝)2 ≥ .5 and it is strictly
superior when 푝 ≠ .5.
What peu recommends According to peu pluralistic, uncertainty-averse egal-
itarianism, you should be uncertainty averse and therefore reject (IV) - as would
advise you, I suspect, any model of decision-making under ambiguity, in a weakly
preferred sense.
Being ambiguity averse in sequential drawing is also irrational First, let
see the irrational way to uncertainty averse, which pluralistic uncertainty-averse
egalitarianism could advice you, but clearly you should not follow in a sequential
setting. This way corresponds to being averse to uncertainty and a non-expected
utility maximizer. In this context, you can be either a naive non-expected utility
maximizer or a sophisticated non-expected utility maximizer.
On the one hand, let us the consider the case where the decision-maker is naive.
By naive, I mean that the decision-maker compares only options available during
the first period, t and does not anticipate the comparison of the future options at
time t+1.
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At time t you compare two options: drawing from ambiguous urn or drawing
from. Since, following peu, the experience of of severe uncertainty should count
as a moral cost, you discard drawing from ambiguous urn and prefer drawing
from risky urn. You look at the color and put the ball back.
Once the first drawing is done, at time t+1, you learn that you have two options
that you had not foreseen, drawing from again risky urn or ambiguous urn.
Again, according to peu you should decide to draw from risky urn.
In resume you went with risky and risky but it is dominated by ambiguous
and risky. If you had thought twice, you would have been better off by going
directly at first with ambiguous and risky. And if you had thought one more,
you would have been maximally better off by going with ambiguous and am-
biguous. But you could not go neither with ambiguous and risky nor with
ambiguous and risky because you followed the uncertainty aversion principle
and had limited rationality. This irrationality can be viewed as a dynamic incon-
sistency.
On the other hand, let me consider the casewhere you are a sophisticated decision-
maker.
At t, you anticipate the choice you will face at time t+1. You depress the value
of option risky and ambiguous because of the presence of ambiguity at the
second stage. And since for the option risky and risky, the second drawing
is dominated by ambiguous and risky, you decide to draw from ambiguous
andrisky, where finally you have 50% chances to have two colors of the sameurn
(since the ambiguous urn is followed automatically by a risky urn, the ambiguity in
18
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the first round has no negative effect on you). You cure Ann but not fully. Despite
not being dynamic inconsistent, the sophisticated agent violates the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives.
For these reasons, the moral permissibility of a distributive theory of justice de-
signed for society as a whole (and not for each individual), based on the violations
of such rationality principles, should be rejected. This could be the original rec-
ommendation emerging from Rowe and Voorhoeve’s use of the Hurwicz criterion,
independently from expected utility theory.
Being ambiguity averse in sequential is unreasonable Second, let see the
unreasonable way to be uncertainty averse, which pluralistic uncertainty-averse
egalitarianism could also advice you. Thisway is compatiblewith being an expected-
utility maximizer. In this context, you will choose option ambiguous and risky
over option risky and risky because the latter is dominated by option ambigu-
ous and risky. Besides, the cost of experiencing uncertainty in risky and am-
biguous is so high that its expected value would be lower than the expected value
of option ambiguous and risky. Therefore you go with option ambiguous
and risky. This is the option that pluralistic egalitarianism that recommends, by
embedding the Hurwicz criterion with expected utility8. This alternative might be
unreasonable compared to option risky and ambiguous.
8One might look at Gul and Pesendorfer (2015),Binmore (2008) and Binmore (2016) for such
kind of a model: the main difference with the original Hurwicz’s criterion Hurwicz (1951) is that
here the concept of uncertainty is decomposed as perceived uncertainty and source uncertainty atti-
tude. The latter corresponds to the original Hurwicz’s criterion that Rowe and Voorhoeve integrate
into their definition of equality under uncertainty, but the former seems not mobilized and inte-
grated in the value functions of their pluralistic egalitarianism.
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If the decision-maker has access to Ann’s information with regards to her attitude,
and she is willing to go with risky and ambiguous, then there is no reasonable
justification, as for me, to overcome her attitude by imposing a cautious attitude
from the social planner on Ann and thus depriving her from an extra lifetime well-
being (gained from 9a). From an aggregation perspective, the correct uncertainty
attitude that the social planner should take into account is the one emerging from
the citizens, except if she has another better - qualitatively speaking - source of
information. But in any event, imposing one’s own attitude for the entire society
seems, at least, questionable and the same for all public policy decisions, evenmore
(evidence might show that citizens are uncertainty averse towards specific public
decisions and uncertainty seeking towards others).
§5 Concluding Remarks
From this paper, one take away is that the Hurwicz criterion, embedded in the
expected utility approach (let’s note it “HEU”) seems to be flexible enough to ac-
commodate different levels of uncertainty attitudes depending on the context of
risk and severe uncertainty. For instance, if maximally uncertainty averse HEU
agents (훼 = 1) always prefer bets on less uncertain sources, HEU agents with an
intermediate level of uncertainty aversion (0 < 훼 < 1) reverse this preferencewhen
the probability of winning is low see (Gul and Pesendorfer (2015).
Finally, I would like to point out some directions we could further discuss in the
comments. Before drawing out one objection below, I rather prefer to suggest four
questions to discuss.
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First, should decision-makers always be uncertain aversion (at the societal level)
when the expected well-being prospects under ambiguity of individuals (at the
individual-level) are very high?
Second, for any distributive theory of justice under severe uncertainty (or ambi-
guity), should we consider in priority the experience of uncertainty as an imper-
missible moral cost and avoid it at all expenses, even if this avoidance lead to the
violation of rational principles or not?
Third, when social planners do not have information regarding citizens’ attitudes
towards uncertainty, which option should they take between a severely uncertain
option with high expected pay-offs and moderately uncertain option with low ex-
pected pay-offs for individuals? Suppose they opt for the less uncertain option, fol-
lowing the recommendations of cautious expectedutility ceu (Cerreia-Vioglio et al.
(2015), in line with those of peu. Should they always use this this theory or is there
any case where it would be better for individuals’ welfare not to follow these latter
theories?
Fourth, when social planners have information regarding citizens’ attitudes to-
wards uncertainty, do they have the moral authority and political legitimacy to
override this information if citizens’ attitudes contradict the recommendations of
ceu and peu and always follow the recommendation of these latter theories or
not ?
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